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ABSTRACT: This paper presents the Functional/Emotional approach to language development, which explains the 
process leading up to the core capacities necessary for language (e.g., pattern-recognition, joint attention); 
shows how this process leads to the formation of internal symbols; and how it shapes and is shaped by the 
child’s development of language. The heart of this approach is that, through a series of affective transfor-
mations, a child develops these core capacities and the capacity to form meaningful symbols. Far from be-
ing a sudden jump, the transition from pre-symbolic communication to language is enabled by the advances 
taking place in the child’s affective gesturing. 
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1. The F/E View of Language Development 
Chomsky began Cartesian Linguistics with the following quotation from Whitehead’s 
Science and the Modern World:  
A brief, and sufficiently accurate, description of the intellectual life of the European races during 
the succeeding two centuries and a quarter up to our own times is that they have been living 
upon the accumulated capital of ideas provided for them by the genius of the seventeenth cen-
tury (Chomsky 1967). 
 Chomsky was certainly right: both in regards to the accuracy of Whitehead’s ob-
servation, and in regards to the significance of this outlook for Chomsky’s whole ap-
proach to language acquisition. But as important as this Cartesian inheritance was for 
the evolution of psycholinguistics, by the end of the 20th century psychologists and 
philosophers were struggling to transcend this legacy, to develop new techniques and 
concepts for studying the development of language. 
In The First Idea, we presented the framework for such a post-Cartesian approach 
(Greenspan & Shanker 2004). Our functional/emotional (f/e) view of language devel-
opment is characterized by the following fundamental themes: 
1. It rejects the Cartesian view of language acquisition as an internal mental pro-
cess and language itself as a code for transmitting one’s thoughts 
2. It rejects the nativist corollary that, given that this system is too complex to 
be acquired inductively, a child must know its most abstract principles ab initio 
3. It insists on a developmental explanation of language development, both in re-
gards to its origins and in regards to each child’s mastery of language skills 
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4. It rejects the discontinuity assumption that there is an unbridgeable gap between 
pre-linguistic forms of communication and language proper 
5. It rejects the Cartesian modularity outlook that our faculties are autonomous 
and, instead, embraces the dynamic systems principle that language acquisi-
tion must be situated in the context of a complex developmental matrix  
6. It rejects the Cartesian exclusion of affect from cognitive and linguistic devel-
opment, seeing affect as not just involved in, but, indeed, as the chief archi-
tect in the development of the mind and language. 
 The heart of this f/e approach to language development is that language skills 
emerge from a series of affective transformations that enable an infant, first, to self-
regulate and take an interest in the world; and then, through a series of additional 
transformations, participate in complex social problem-solving interactions; engage in 
joint attention; perceive subtle social and communicative patterns; ‘read’ other peo-
ple’s intentions; imitate increasingly sophisticated actions; develop a sense of ‘self’; and 
construct symbols (The First Idea chapters 1 and 2). The present paper takes this argu-
ment a step further by relating this framework to recent advances in the study of lan-
guage development.  
 The emphasis here is very much on the word advances, which have occurred in a 
number of areas, both empirical and theoretical. On the empirical front, there have 
been important studies on the role of pattern-recognition (Elman et al. 1996; Saffran, 
Aslin & Newport 1996), joint attention (Tomasello & Farrar 1986; Tomasello 1988), 
and ‘mindreading’ (Tomasello 1999) in language development. There has also been a 
wealth of research on the gradual and piecemeal fashion in which children master lin-
guistic constructions (Tomasello 2003). Furthermore, striking studies have occurred in 
what we have described elsewhere as ‘borderline’ areas of language research (Shanker 
2002a): e.g., the remarkable results obtained with language-enculturated apes (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al. 1993); or the recovery made by young children with serious language 
delays as a result of intensive speech language therapy (Greenspan & Wieder 1998; Ta-
llal et al. 1996).  
 What these borderline areas of language research highlight is the importance of co-
regulated affective interactions for the development of linguistic skills (Shanker & 
King 2002). Language does not suddenly appear at some pre-determined age in some 
pre-determined fashion but rather, emerges after the ape or child has begun to engage 
with his or her caregivers in such co-regulated activities as sharing, requesting, imitat-
ing, playing, naming, describing, apologizing, etc. The ape or child is increasingly mo-
tivated to use and develop these communicational tools so that he or she may achieve 
context-dependent, interactional goals: goals which themselves develop as a function 
of the ape or child’s developing communicational environment and his or her growing 
abilities and increasingly differentiated affects. By stipulating on the basis of a formal 
definition of ‘language’ that such research cannot reveal anything about the processes 
involved in language development, the nativist denies a priori the possibility of learning 
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anything about the role of affect in the development of language: which, of course, is 
one of the defining features of Cartesianism. 
 On the theoretical front, the most important advance has been in the rise of usage-
based theories, according to which language structure emerges from use and not, as 
nativists would argue, the other way round. Cognitive-functional linguists have made 
considerable inroads over the past decade in identifying the caregiver-specific and lan-
guage-specific processes whereby children slowly master, first item-based, and then 
more abstract linguistic structures. This material is masterfully surveyed in Tomasello’s 
Constructing a language, A usage-based theory of language acquisition: a book that will come to 
be seen as a seminal event in the overthrowal of the nativist paradigm that so domi-
nated psycholinguistics in the 1970s and 1980s (Tomasello 2003).  
 The importance of this learning-based approach for a post-Cartesian paradigm 
cannot be stressed highly enough. In place of the nativist paradigm that insists that 
language acquisition must be guided by an innate universal grammar, usage-based 
theorists have tried to show how language development can be explained in terms of 
the same set of cognitive, social-cognitive, and learning processes that are used to ac-
count for other types of cultural learning. In particular, usage-based theorists have 
shown how language-learning builds on pattern-recognition and joint attentional skills. 
But these core capacities are ‘downstream’ abilities that occur relatively late in human 
development, typically between 7 and 9 months. Unless one can explain how they de-
velop, nativists can respond that it is only the specifics and not the essence of Carte-
sianism that has been altered; that is, that if not a ‘language gene’ then it must be these 
core capacities that are genetically determined and that categorically separate nonlin-
guistic from linguistic forms of communication.  
 In order to develop a truly post-Cartesian account of language development, there-
fore, we need to understand:  
1. The process leading up to these core capacities  
2. How this same process leads to the formation of internal symbols 
3. The manner in which this process then shapes and is shaped by the child’s 
development of language skills. 
 It is precisely here where the f/e hypothesis plays a vital role in the pursuit of a 
complete theory of language development; for the crux of the f/e hypothesis is that 
the answer to these questions lies in the affective transformations that a child under-
goes as a result of particular types of nurturing interactions with her caregivers. That 
is, the abilities for pattern-recognition, joint attention and understanding the inten-
tions of others are a downstream result of the initial stages of affective transformation 
described in detail in The First Idea. Through affective transformations, the child de-
velops these core capacities and the capacity to form meaningful symbols, which, 
together, are requisite for the transition from pre-symbolic forms of communication 
to language. Far from being a sudden jump, this transition is enabled by the advances 
taking place in the child’s affective gesturing. But how does this process play out in 
the actual mastery of words, and then, increasingly abstract linguistic constructions? In 
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the remainder of this paper we will look more closely at this third of the questions 
posed above: viz., the question of how affective gesturing shapes and continues to be 
shaped by the child’s development of language skills. 
2. The Child’s Entry into Language 
Cartesianism casts the problem of the initial stages of language acquisition in terms of 
what, at the beginning of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein presents as the clas-
sic ‘Augustinian’ problem of how a child with no language is able to infer what a word 
means by observing the actions and utterances of the adults around her (Wittgenstein 
1953, §1; Baker & Hacker 1980). That is, the child has to map the appropriate term 
onto the appropriate referent that constitutes its meaning, whether this should be an 
object, an activity, a state, a social act, etc. The first part of the Investigations is designed 
to demonstrate the incoherence of such a picture, in order to undermine the referen-
tial theory of meaning on which this picture is based: namely, that all words function 
as names whose meanings a child must infer.  
 Nativists responded to Wittgenstein’s intricate arguments on the indeterminacy of 
reference (further elaborated in Quine 1960) by insisting that the child must therefore 
have a number of ‘constraints’ built into her mind that enable her to identify the ap-
propriate referent of a word. But apart from the worry that such a strategy represents 
“the advantages of theft over honest toil” (Russell 1919), we must be careful that we 
do not overlook the point of Wittgenstein’s critique, which is to shift us from reifying 
the concept of meaning (e.g., thinking of the meaning of a word as the object or idea it 
denotes) to thinking of ‘meaning’ as a reflexive term that language-users employ to re-
gulate linguistic behavior (see Taylor 1992, 1997). On this Wittgensteinian approach, 
the acquisition of first words is seen as the gradual mastery of a set of practical, inter-
actional techniques whereby a child engages with those in her social environment 
(learns how to refer to things, express intentions, describe states-of-affairs, make 
promises and excuses, etc.), and acquires such reflexive skills as being able to explain 
what the word means, correct misuses, etc. (Shanker 2001; Shanker & Taylor 2001).  
 Usage-based theorists have taken this message to heart (as is reflected in the quota-
tions from Philosophical Investigations that serve as epigrams at the start of several chap-
ters in Constructing a Language). In usage-based theories, language is first and foremost a 
social activity, which, as such, can only be acquired in the context of social interac-
tions. The key to developing this insight in a truly post-Cartesian fashion, however, is 
to avoid falling back on the Cartesian view of language acquisition as an inferential 
process (e.g., where the child’s inferences would be said to be enabled by her ‘min-
dreading’ abilities and constrained by interactive experiences and the child’s develop-
ing language skills rather than built-in processing biases).  
 The central premise of the f/e hypothesis is that it is affect that prevents this so-
cial-cognitive approach from collapsing into a mentalist thesis; for it is affective trans-
formations that lead up to a child’s ability to understand a speaker’s communicative 
intentions and co-regulated affective gesturing that shapes this understanding. With-
out such a developmental perspective, there is not only a tendency to treat this capac-
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ity as innate, but further, there is a danger that the ongoing role of co-regulated affect 
gesturing in language development will be overlooked (a point that is also reflected in 
novel word experiments, which require the adult to speak in heightened affective to-
nes if the child is to attend to the use of and thus learn the meaning of the nonce 
word (Akhtar, Carpenter and Tomasello 1996)). 
 For Cartesianism, the problems involved in first word acquisition are those that 
have long troubled logicians (Mill 1843; Frege 1891; Russell 1904; Quine 1973): viz., 
how is a child able to isolate the appropriate segment from a speech stream, select the 
appropriate features of a referent, and map this name onto its referent – a problem 
that is especially perplexing when the ‘referent’ in question is, e.g., an activity, 
property, or process. Cartesianism limits us to the problematic alternatives that either 
there are innate biases for selecting the appropriate linguistic term and referent 
(Macnamara & Reyes 1994), or else it is caregiver behavior that facilitates this mental 
mapping (Gallway & Richards 1994). The problem with the former strategy is that 
such constraints function as a way of building in from the start the properties of the 
language code that the Cartesian view of language stipulates (Shanker 2001); while the 
problem with the latter is that, on the Cartesian framework, even the most die-hard of 
empiricists is forced in the end to concede that “Any behaviorist account of the 
learning process is openly and emphatically committed to innate beginnings. The behav-
iorist recognizes the indispensability, for any kind of learning, of prior biases and 
affinities” (Quine 1970). 
 Initial attempts to develop a non-nativist view of a child’s entry into language sought 
to explain the order in which first words were acquired in terms of their frequency of 
use and their semantic complexity (Nelson 1977; Owens 1996). But while frequency 
and complexity are clearly critical factors, they cannot be the whole story; for it takes a 
child a considerable amount of time to learn some of the most frequently used words 
(e.g., determiners). Conversely, some of a child’s first words may have a relatively low 
frequency in caregiver utterances, or, can be relatively complex. Thus, as usage-based 
theorists have pointed out, saliency must be a critical factor as well; but then, what de-
termines the saliency of a word?  
 There are several cognitive and social elements involved: e.g., the ability to perceive 
patterns and segment speech; the fact that in many situations the structure of an inter-
active experience highlights the use of a word (as is reflected in novel word experi-
ments). But as Tomasello has shown, one of the most important factors in what de-
termines the saliency of a word for a child lies in the child’s ability to engage in joint at-
tentional frames, in which the child looks where her caregiver is looking and imitates her 
caregiver’s actions (Tomasello 2003: 21ff). Typically, this ability emerges around the 
age of 9 months. But the very fact that this is such a relatively late phenomenon in the 
momentous first year of life tells us that there must have been a number of key devel-
opmental events leading up to it.   
 One need only look at those children that initially experience a great deal of diffi-
culty engaging in joint attentional frames, such as children with autism, to appreciate 
the full significance of this point. There is now extensive evidence to show that the 
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more constricted a child’s attentional abilities the more severe their language deficits 
(Mundy & Sigman 1989; Mundy, Sigman & Kasari 1990). Even more important, it has 
been shown that if such children receive early intervention programmes that are de-
signed to help them go through the same affective transformations as children devel-
oping normally, they frequently develop age-matched joint attentional and language 
skills, and form warm affective relationships with their caregivers and peers (Green-
span & Wieder 1998; Siller & Sigman 2002). In fact, a sub-group of children diag-
nosed with autism that underwent such a programme and are now in middle or late 
adolescence have been shown to have reached levels of empathy and creative and re-
flective thinking formerly thought to be unobtainable by even the highest functioning 
of children with autistic spectrum disorder (Greenspan & Wieder 2005). 
 For a joint attentional frame to occur, the baby needs to have been wooed into a 
warm pleasurable relationship with one or a few caregivers, so that there is another 
human being toward whom she experiences deep emotions and, therefore, with 
whom she wants to communicate. She also needs opportunities to act intentionally, to 
express an emotion or need by making a sound, using a facial expression or making a 
gesture with her arm, and to have her efforts become part of a co-regulated interac-
tion. This is precisely what we saw in our example in the first section. S. initiates the 
action with a vocalization and expresses his annoyance through a more emphatic ver-
sion of the same vocalization with a pronounced facial expression. He and his father 
enter into a finely tuned, back-and-forth interaction, through their vocalizations and 
facial expressions, in what becomes a co-regulated solution of the problem for which 
S. sought his father’s help. 
 It is only on the basis of these affective experiences that a child is able to establish 
and maintain joint attentional frames. This latter point is critical. Joint attentional 
frames are not a fixed cognitive event, like the moment when two fax machines get 
linked up. A joint attentional frame is an ongoing communicative process that is established 
and sustained by back-and-forth affective gesturing involving a number of modalities 
(e.g., facial expressions, hand and arm gestures, tones of voice, posture, etc.). In the 
context of these back-and-forth affective exchanges, the child is not simply ‘reading’ a 
caregiver’s intentions and imitating her actions; she is engaged in a co-regulated activ-
ity that shapes her actions and her emotional understanding of whatever it is to which 
both members of the dyad are attending. These multi-modal affect gestures include, 
not just the expansions, extensions, recasts, repetitions, etc., that are a prominent fea-
ture of Child Directed Speech, but also, changes in facial expressions, eye gaze, tone 
of voice, arm movements, etc. (Fogel 1993). 
 It is this emotional dimension of the child’s first words that is totally missing – in-
deed, excluded – on the Cartesian paradigm, which treats word acquisition as purely a 
cognitive (or social-cognitive) phenomenon. But in order for a child to master first 
words – as opposed to memorizing labels or scripts — they must be invested with 
emotional significance for that child. Indeed, words themselves can be seen as a more 
complex type of affect gesture, embedded in a more complex social-communicative 
practice than, e.g., declarative gestures (Agar 1994; Armstrong, Stokoe & Wilcox 
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1985). Such a point is perspicuous when one is dealing with a word like ‘mommy’ 
(which is why it is so frequently amongst a child’s earliest words); but it is true for 
even the simplest of common nouns. Thus, ‘apple’ is not simply the name of some-
thing with a number of distinctive ‘features’ (round, red, has a stem): it is the word 
you use to ask for your favourite snack because it’s sweet and juicy and makes a 
crunchy noise when you bite it. ‘Truck’ is not just the name of a rectangular metal box 
sitting atop four round objects; it is the toy that is so much fun to push around the 
floor while making the sounds ‘vroom, vroom’. Without this emotional dimension, 
‘apple’ and ‘truck’ would simply be markers paired with an object: which, as such, 
would have extremely low salience for the child. This point is familiar to all speech 
language therapists who work with children with severe language disorders; for the 
first step in any effective therapy is to find those words with which the child resonates 
most strongly. 
 It is precisely because of this emotional dimension that a model of ‘text processing’ 
that applies to computer programs has such limited bearing on how a child actually 
masters language skills. It was only because of the bifurcation of reason and emotion 
that AI scientists, whose thinking was grounded in this Cartesian framework, could as-
sume that word-acquisition is solely a process of ‘feature-detection’ and name-referent 
mapping (Shanker 1998). Interestingly, such a model has its greatest applicability when 
this aspect of emotional experience is missing or derailed. In such cases a child’s first 
words are highly mechanical, almost automaton-like. This is what we see in some chil-
dren with autism. They just repeat words, or, perhaps, can be trained through inten-
sive behavioral techniques to use a word appropriately in some circumscribed context, 
without any real sense of what the word means or how to use it in wider contexts.1 If 
they have little affective response to something (i.e., neither positive nor negative) they 
have a great deal of difficulty using that word spontaneously. But if they love the 
sweet taste of a marshmallow or hate the sour taste of yoghurt, they can quickly mas-
ter even these phonetically difficult words (or at least, near approximations). What we 
are learning from the study of such children goes far beyond the creation of effective 
therapy programmes for language disorders, however; rather, we are beginning to un-
derstand the developmental pathway that leads to the emergence of language skills. 
3. Future Research  
The crux of the f/e approach to early word development is that affective experience 
provides the critical missing piece in the cognitive and social factors that determine 
the salience of a word for a child. But it is not simply in regards to a child’s first words 
                                                     
1 This was precisely the issue that concerned critics in their initial response to Sue Savage-Rumbaugh’s re-
search with Kanzi; it was only when she proved that Kanzi had not simply been trained on a number 
of lexigram-object pairings but was actually using these lexigrams in a meaningful manner, which in-
cludes the reflexive skills that are an essential element for describing a subject as ‘knowing what “w” 
means’, that critics were prepared to concede that Kanzi had indeed mastered words (see Wallman 
1992, Kako 1999; Taylor & Shanker 2002). 
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where this affective dimension is so important. As her language learning progresses, 
the child acquires more and more domain-specific skills. For example, linguistic con-
text comes to play an ever more significant role in word acquisition (i.e., situations in 
which the child’s familiarity with other words helps her to understand the meaning of 
a new word). So too does lexical contrast, according to which a child assumes that 
closely-related words in the same ‘semantic field’ must have subtly different meanings; 
i.e., the child uses lexical contrast as a source of information about the meaning of a 
newly encountered word (Clark 1993). But affect gesturing remains a vital component 
of these more advanced word-learning processes. 
 The key to seeing the importance of this point is to remember the Wittgensteinian 
attack on the Cartesian reification of ‘meaning’. It is not a symbol itself that picks out 
a particular way of viewing a phenomenon: on its own as it were, such that it causes a 
child to see a segment of reality in the manner “embodied” in that symbol. (Such an 
argument would be reminiscent of what Orwell said about ‘Newspeak’ in 1984.) Rat-
her, it is the way language-speakers use near synonyms (and the context in which they 
are used) that shape the child’s understanding of these words. These language-games 
may have deep historical roots; but the subtle differences between closely-related 
words are learned anew from one generation to the next through subtle variations in 
affect signals, which a child learns implicitly and then in turn passes on. Just think of 
how, in English, we pronounce words like ‘slow’, ‘fast’; ‘dawdle’, ‘hurry’; ‘linger’, 
‘rush’; ‘loiter’, ‘dash’. Try saying each word in these pairs with the opposite intonation 
and tempo and you quickly realize how important these affect overtones are for how 
we learn and use these words. The same point applies to closely-related words in the 
same semantic field; for example, we utter words like ‘rushing’, ‘hurrying’, ‘bustling’ in 
subtly distinctive ways that summon up, in the same sort of way as programme music, 
images of  these different activities.2 The critical distinction that we’re making, there-
fore, is that it is not the comprehension of the word that leads the child to make the 
distinction between slow, dawdle, etc., but the affective rhythm within which the vocal 
tones are originally used that lead the child to comprehend the meaning of the word. 
(see also the contrast between the mother’s vocalizations of ‘gentle’ versus ‘hard’ in 
example below of the 2 year-old playing with the dog on p.??) 
 These semantic/affective nuances, which earlier logicians referred to as a word’s 
connotation and post-Fregean philosophers as the ‘sense’ of the word, are a function 
of those elements of speech referred to as paralinguistic and nonlinguistic cues. These 
affect gestures constitute an essential element in the different uses of words, and thus, 
in the child’s ‘representations’ of those words. In The First Idea we outlined how com-
plex reciprocal emotional interactions lead to the ability to separate perceptions from 
                                                     
2 Criminal lawyers are quite adept at exploiting these affective differences and devote considerable 
thought to the terms they use in their questioning. For example, just asking a witness what they 
thought when they saw the defendant leaving the store can produce a very different response than if 
the witness is asked: ‘What did you think when you saw the defendant darting (hurrying, dashing, tearing) 
from the store’, adjusting their own gestures, intonation, facial expression, etc., to highlight the im-
ages associated with each of these words. 
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actions (i.e., a stimulus does not trigger an automatic response). Such a developmental 
advance enables the child to form what have traditionally been referred to as stable 
‘mental representations’, which can then be imbued with many emotional experiences. 
For example, if a child thinks of her mother she might think of playing, eating, being 
comforted, and so forth. In such a fashion the child’s mental representation’ of her 
mother acquires emotional “meaning” and texture. But it is not just in regards to se-
mantics where this point is so important; it also applies to the child’s mastery of 
grammar. For example, a child who is beginning to acquire pivot schemas has not 
simply memorized that ‘more’ is the name of a quantity-term; ‘more’ is another help-
ing of something tasty, ‘no more’ is a dose of nasty medicine; ‘big’ is the slightly men-
acing older child who is charging around the room; ‘little’ is the toddler who is my size 
and isn’t scary.3
 In other words, the f/e approach accords closely with the basic usage-based prin-
ciple that the same factors that apply to word-learning apply to more complex con-
structions. On this reading, a child’s initial acquisitions are, as Tomasello argues, con-
crete and item-based (Tomasello 2003 chapters 4,5); but what makes them so concrete 
is precisely their affective dimension. This can be seen particularly clearly when work-
ing with a child who has not progressed beyond the level of first words. One may try 
to foster these preliminary grammatical skills by drilling the child over and over on 
some specific pivot schema, but such forms of speech-language therapy prove highly 
frustrating for both child and therapist alike. The problem here is that one has focused 
too much on the specific construction and entirely ignored the affective processes that 
lead up to the ability to master that construction. It is far more effective to work on 
these building-blocks – i.e., on the child’s ability to engage in long chains of co-
regulated affect gesturing – than to attempt to install a grammatical construction when 
these building-blocks are not yet in place. 
 We will shortly be publishing the results of the first in a series of studies that sup-
port this developmental hypothesis. In one study of a representative sample of typi-
cally developing infants and children, and different clinical populations ranging from 
Downs Syndrome to Pervasive Developmental Disorder and Autism, we observed a 
very strong correlation between levels of presymbolic emotional interaction and sym-
bolic capacities. For the normative population (n= 456) r = 0.59, p<.0001; for the cli-
nical populations correlations ranged from r = 0.51 for an At-Risk group (n = 94, 
p<.0001) to r = 0.7 for the PDD group (n = 64, p<.0001) to r = 0.93 for the Autism 
group (n = 12, p<.0001). In another study on infants and young children with autism 
receiving a comprehensive developmental intervention programme (Greenspan & 
Wieder 1998), we found that the rate of improvement in the first four levels of affec-
tive interaction strongly predicted the rate of change in symbolic functioning. The cor-
relation between pre-symbolic and symbolic scores was 0.72, t (7) = 2.77, p = .028. 
Approximately, 52% of the variance of the symbolic scores was accounted for by their 
                                                     
3 The very way we say words like ‘more’ and ‘big’ versus ‘small’ and ‘little’ reinforces these associations; 
try, e.g., clipping the vowels of the first two and elongating the vowels in the latter. 
 
Stuart G. SHANKER and Stanley I. GREENSPAN 338 
linear relationship with the pre-symbolic scores. This strong correlation between the 
first four levels of f/e development and language ability meshes closely with research 
by Michael Siller and Marian Sigman that showed that caregivers of children with au-
tism who were more responsive in their synchronization and continued interaction 
during play with their children enabled them to develop better joint attention skills 
and language over a period of one, ten, and sixteen years than did children of caregiv-
ers who were less emotionally responsive and interactive (Siller & Sigman 2002). 
 We are engaged in additional studies that are looking more closely at how the con-
tours of affect gesturing help shape the different parts of speech that a child masters. 
We already know that when caregivers recast utterances that are missing some particu-
lar grammatical morpheme this helps their child acquire that morpheme (Farrar 1990). 
But, as we can see in the following example, long before CDS becomes a significant 
factor in a child’s language-learning, caregivers are using subtle shifts in intonation and 
rhythm to highlight the salience of morphological markers that are used to indicate 
agent-patient relations. 
S., a 2 year-old, is playing on the floor with the dog. Suddenly the dog yelps and Mother, who is 
cooking at the stove, turns round in time to see S. hitting the dog with a soup strainer. She hur-
ries over and, taking the strainer from S., kneels on the floor and in a tender voice says: ‘gently 
sweetheart. You see, you have to stroke Mundy gently. (As she says this she gently strokes the 
dog.) Not hard (which she says in a harsh voice with her face tigthening). Gently (which she says 
in a soft lilting voice, her facial features relaxing). S. listens to her intently and moves his hand in 
rhythm with her hand and voice and begins to vocalize to the rhythmic contours of her vocaliza-
tion. Peace restored she returns to the stove but, a few seconds later, Mundy yelps again. This 
time without turning round she murmurs ‘gentleeeee’ and S. starts to stroke the dog in the man-
ner he’d just been shown. 
What is so striking about this example is not simply that the caregiver places so much 
emphasis on the grammatical morpheme, but that the manner in which she does so 
accentuates the actual stroking action that she wants the child to perform. It is 
through episodes such as this, repeated countless times, that a caregiver highlights 
grammatical constructions long before motherese becomes a significant factor in the 
child’s language development. Typically, when a toddler is mastering a linguistic form, 
the caregiver is repeating a particular affect gesture with subtle variations in many dif-
ferent contexts (such as when the child is playing a little too boisterously with his baby 
sister and mother softly utters ‘gentleee’). 
 There are two further aspects of the f/e hypothesis that shed important light on 
this process: one concerning the development of a child’s processing abilities, and a 
second that concerns the socioaffective history that frames a child’s mastery of lin-
guistic constructions. Current research indicates that when children have trouble mas-
tering grammatical morphemes, it is primarily because of their low perceptual salience 
and reduced communicational weight (Leonard 1998). It is now well established, how-
ever, that if begun early, traditional speech language therapy can enable up to half of 
such children to acquire age-matched morpho-syntactic skills (Shanker 2002b). An 
even higher rate of success has been obtained when, in addition to heightening the af-
fective salience of specific linguistic constructions, the therapy is designed to enhance 
 
The Role of Affect in Language Development 339 
the child’s ability to sustain affective engagement in prolonged co-regulated interac-
tions (Greenspan & Lewis 2002).  
 Rather than construing such results as an artifact produced by enhancing the 
child’s cognitive abilities (Gopnik et al. 1997), the f/e hypothesis takes as its starting-
point the importance of establishing the role of affect gesturing in such therapies 
(Shanker 2002). This point even applies to the recent research on the temporal aspects 
of auditory processing, which has shown that by presenting text at a speed that a child 
with a language disorder can process, her temporal processing abilities can be signifi-
cantly enhanced (Tallal, et al., 1996). Too slow a presentation, however, may make 
pattern recognition more difficult. Research in progress on the Interactive Metronome 
(Shaffer et al. 2001) is revealing an optimal range below which sound patterns are very 
difficult to perceive. This research is also identifying differences in the degree to 
which individuals with different processing challenges can perceive these patterns.  
 The three primary causes of such challenges appear to be that a child is born over-
reactive or under-reactive to sounds; has difficulty in discriminating subtle nuances in 
sounds; and difficulty in sequencing sounds. Before one jumps to the conclusion that 
all such deficits must be biological, however, it is important to note that the same pro-
cessing deficits can be caused by caregiver neglect or abuse (Greenspan et al. 1987). 
Furthermore, there are many situations where a child’s processing deficits appear to 
be a function of a synergistic effect between these two factors. But regardless of 
whether the processing deficits are constitutional, environmentally caused, or a 
combination of the two, it has been shown that tailoring the temporal and rhythmic 
dimensions of one’s speech to suit a child’s sensory and processing strengths and 
weaknesses can significantly enhance his or her ability to master linguistic construc-
tions (Greenspan & Wieder 2002). 
 Such a finding reinforces the f/e hypothesis outlined in the opening section of this 
paper that the ability to perceive subtle linguistic patterns is part of a gradual devel-
opmental progression in which co-regulated emotional interactions serve as the in-
strument for more and more refined pattern recognition abilities. That is, through the 
continuous flow of affective interactions with her caregiver, a toddler becomes able to 
perceive more and more complex interactive patterns and to discriminate subtle recur-
rent elements within and across patterns. Thus, the ability to perform the types of lin-
guistic analysis that played such a prominent role in generativist thinking, such as dis-
tributional analysis, are not innate but are part of a developmental progression that 
proceeds from the child’s earliest affective interactions with her caregivers. Further-
more, such ‘distributional analysis’ is enabled by affective patterns that are used to 
mark constructions (e.g., a falling tone and diminuendo for ‘-ly’, a falling tone and glot-
tal stop for ‘-ed’, and so on). 
 This developmental perspective on the pathways leading up to more complex pat-
tern-recognition abilities sheds important light on the fundamental usage-based prin-
ciple that “constructions are nothing more or less than patterns of usage” (Tomasello 
2003: 100). Extensive research on caregiver utterances is starting to reveal some unex-
pectedly robust patterns in caregiver speech. Also highly important here is the body of 
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work that has been done on the familiar routines that Bruner referred to as ‘formats’ 
(Bruner 1983). The formats that Bruner describes, in which a caregiver and child en-
gage together in a familiar activity, such as “peek-a-boo,” getting dressed, bathing, or 
playing with toys, are a means of entering language and culture simultaneously; indeed, 
the two cannot be meaningfully separated. They are simple game-like microcosmic 
versions of the everyday means by which competent members of a culture cooperate 
in integrating their vocalizations and actions for the purpose of achieving some shared 
goal. But while some formats may have a particular purpose, such as bathing or dress-
ing, many are performed simply to amuse a child, or to occupy her, or just for the fun 
of it. As Bruner pointed out, formats serve as the nursery for language/cultural devel-
opment. They are crucially adaptable to the child’s developing skills; indeed, this 
adaptability is exploited by the caregiver as she encourages the child, step-by-step, to 
try more sophisticated communicational means of participating in their interactions. 
 Because the affective dimension of these formats has hitherto been overlooked, 
there has been a strong tendency to construe them as facilitative devices that enable a 
child to infer the grammatical properties of language or the reference/use of a term 
(where ‘collections of rules’ takes the role played by objects and ideas in earlier refer-
ential theories of meaning). Far more illuminating is to view formats in terms of the 
notion of ‘communicative musicality’ (Thomson 2004; Dissanayake 1995). That is, 
through the sorts of temporal, rhythmic, and tonal elements that we refer to in The 
First Idea as affect signals, caregivers gradually facilitate the child’s active participation 
in co-regulated ‘musical interactions’. It is through such interactions that the child 
gradually makes the transition from concrete routines to more abstract syntactic con-
structions. In the dog-patting example above, the caregiver does several things to calm 
down a child who is being a little boisterous, while murmuring ‘gently’. With time the 
word ‘gently’ starts to take over for the original behavioural routine (similar to the way 
in which, e.g., in The Ring, Wagner is able to recall a motif with just a few notes). Thus, 
the child becomes increasingly able to generalize from the original socioaffective con-
text into an infinite number of other possible contexts in which the construction is 
embedded. What continues in this gradual process of linguistic abstraction is the con-
tinuance of the affective experience that originally gave rise to the grammatical form 
in question.  
 Such an argument provides an interesting twist on the original Fregean Context 
Principle. In place of the compositional interpretation of this principle (viz., as stipu-
lating that the semantic value of a word consists in the contribution that it makes to 
the overall semantic value of an utterance), we have the f/e principle that a child’s 
mastery of a word or construction has a developmental history: i.e., a word or con-
struction has meaning only in the context of a formative socioaffective pattern. Herein 
lies a further reason why language therapies that ignore the role of affect are so diffi-
cult to implement; for in simply trying to drill a child on the use of a construction, one 
is bypassing the critical affective history that plays such an important role in shaping a 
child’s mastery of a linguistic construction.  
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 To be sure, we are still in the very early stages of the transition to a post-Cartesian 
framework. But already one can see the great importance of the shift to a paradigm 
that: 
(a) insists on a developmental explanation of language development, and  
(b) sees affect as providing the central thrust in this developmental trajectory.  
Rather than continuing to live off the accumulated capital of 17th century ideas, we are 
striking out in new, non-mechanistic directions. The exciting potential of this post-
Cartesian framework has already been demonstrated in borderline areas of language 
research, where we can observe in close detail how affective interactions promote the 
development of the core capacities that underlie language. The next step in the formu-
lation of a complete theory of language development is to understand how these core 
capacities continue to shape and be shaped by a child’s ongoing linguistic develop-
ment.  
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